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In  recent years, macroeconomists have  devoted renewed attention to under- 
standing the monetary transmission mechanism. According to the standard 
“money” view,  an  open-market sale of  bonds by  the central bank forces up 
interest rates because bond holders must be compensated with higher interest 
income for holding a less liquid combination of assets. Although textbook pre- 
sentations of this view often assume that banks are involved in the transmission 
of the open-market sale, the presence of banks, and particularly bank loans, is 
in no way necessary. 
The alternative “lending” view of the monetary transmission mechanism as- 
sumes that bank loans are a special form of  external finance. Banks do not 
regard loans and bonds as perfect substitutes on the asset side of their balance 
sheets, and firms do not regard bank loans as equivalent to other sources of 
funds on the liability side of their balance sheets. Since banks faced with a loss 
of  reserves prefer to reduce the interest-bearing component of their portfolio 
partly via loans and partly via securities, and since firms do not view securities 
as perfect substitutes for bank loans, the interest rate on loans must increase 
relative to that on securities. This increase in the “spread” reflects an additional 
contractionary effect of restrictive monetary policy that is absent in the pure 
money view of the transmission mechanism. 
This paper provides historical perspective on the monetary transmission 
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mechanism.  Several recent papers attempt to determine whether the special 
nature of  bank  lending impinges on the monetary transmission  mechanism 
(Bernanke  1983;  Calomiris  and  Hubbard  1989;  Bordo,  Rappaport,  and 
Schwartz 1992; Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox  1993; Romer and Romer 1990; 
Hall and Thomson  1993), and a number of these examine the transmission 
mechanism  in particular  historical  episodes (Calomiris and Hubbard  1989; 
Bordo, Rappaport, and Schwartz 1992; Bemanke 1983). None of these papers, 
however,  explores  changes  in  the  nature  of  the  transmission  mechanism 
over time. In this paper we directly examine the changes in financial market 
institutions over the last one hundred years, and we show how these changes 
can be used to assess the importance of the lending channel of monetary trans- 
mission. 
Section 8.1 presents the basic analytical framework. We use the Bernanke 
and Blinder (1988) model of  the monetary transmission mechanism to show 
under what conditions the response of the economy to a monetary contraction 
should be especially sensitive to the presence of a lending channel. Each of the 
conditions we identify can be examined in the data over long historical periods. 
We can therefore determine whether the lending channel appears to be im- 
portant in periods when theory combined with evidence on the financial struc- 
ture suggests it should be important. 
Section 8.2 examines empirically those features of  bank and firm balance 
sheets that our theoretical discussion suggests are most relevant to the quantita- 
tive importance of  the lending channel. In particular we document how such 
factors as the structure of reserve requirements and the composition of external 
firm finance have changed over time. Our analysis shows that the lending chan- 
nel should have played a much greater role in the pre- 1929 era than during the 
early part of the post-World  War I1 period. 
In section 8.3 we present new evidence on the lending channel by determin- 
ing whether measures of the importance of  bank lending behave differently 
across periods characterized by differences in those factors that our theoretical 
discussion suggests determine the strength of the lending channel. The meas- 
ures we consider are the spread between the interest rate on bank loans and the 
interest rate on commercial paper, the ratio of bank loans to other sources of 
credit (the “mix”), and the relation between bank loans and output after mone- 
tary contractions and in more ordinary times. We find little evidence that these 
measures of the importance of the lending channel change across time periods 
in the ways implied by changes in financial structure and institutions. 
Section 8.4 concludes the paper. The evidence we present can be interpreted 
in at least two ways. On the one hand, it may indicate that traditional indicators 
of the importance of the lending channel are not useful. On the other hand, it 
may indicate that the lending channel has not been particularly important in 
any sample period. Our analysis does not rule decisively on which of these 
two explanations is correct. However, since the most obvious indicators of the 
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lieve proponents of this view are likely to have a difficult time providing a 
compelling case for its empirical relevance. 
8.1  Framework for Analysis 
We  begin by laying out a model of the monetary transmission mechanism 
that  considers the relative importance of  different financing channels. The 
model is a modified version of  the one presented in Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988). We use the model to highlight the role of various institutional features 
in determining the importance of the lending channel. 
8.1.1  The Model 
We  begin by considering the more familiar model in which loans play no 
role. The only assets are money, m, and bonds, b. Our notation is that small 
letters signify quantities, capital letters signify functions, subscripts signify 
derivatives, and superscripts signify subsets of quantities (for example, b is 
bonds while bb is bonds held by banks). Since the price level and the inflation 
rate are held fixed throughout, we normalize them to 1 and 0, respectively. All 
variables are therefore in real terms. 
The demand for money depends on output, y, and the bond interest rate, i, 
m = D(i,y). 
As in the standard IS curve, output depends negatively on the interest rate, 
(2)  y  = Y(i). 
Differentiating (1) and (2) yields 
(3) 
Equation (3) shows the effect of money on output when only the money chan- 
nel is operational. 
Theories of the lending channel begin by  recognizing the existence of  an- 
other asset, loans, 1.  The banking sector’s balance sheet is then 
(4)  m = bh + 1 + r, 
where r is reserves and bb  is net holdings of bonds by banks. Note that we treat 
time deposits and certificates of  deposit (CDs) as bank-issued bonds, which 
are subtracted from bank holdings of  bonds in calculating bb. All money is 
held in the form of deposits, which are liabilities of banks. Nonbank holdings 
of nominally denominated assets, w,  are given by 
(5)  w = bp + m -  1, 
where bp is net bond holdings of the nonbank public. Note that we include both 
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the short run the stock of  nominally denominated assets held by  the nonbank 
sector is fixed. 
Introducing a third asset requires introducing a second interest rate. Rather 
than including the interest rate on loans directly, we introduce the difference 
between the loan interest rate and the bond interest rate, 6, which affects invest- 
ment demand. Thus (2) becomes 
(6)  y  = Y(i,6), 
where  < 0 and Y, < 0. The demand for loans by  the nonbank public is 
(7)  1 = L(G,i,Y), 
where L, < 0. We  discuss the signs of L, and L, below. 
Banks hold deposits as liabilities, and loans and reserves as assets. Combin- 
ing the models of Romer and Romer (1990) and Bernanke and Blinder (1988), 
we allow banks to hold bonds as either assets or liabilities, with time deposits 
and CDs defined as bank-issued bonds. We define bb as banks’ net holdings of 
bonds. As discussed by  Romer and Romer, bond issues by banks may or may 
not require significant reserve holdings. We  assume that if  reserve require- 
ments are imposed on bond issue, then banks will not both hold and issue 
bonds, except for small quantities of bonds held for liquidity purposes. Thus 
the reserve requirement holds on the net issue of bonds. 
We  take the fraction of bank deposits held as reserves against demand de- 
posits to be constant at some level T~  that can be thought of  as required or 
desired reserves. Reserves against bond issues are taken to be constant at rate 
7,.  Banks choose the fraction of nonreserve assets held in the form of loans as 
a function of the loan-bond interest differential, 
~- -  A  = A(&), 
1 
1 + bb 
where A, > 0.’ If  X is less than one, banks hold bonds on net. If  A is greater 
than one, banks issue bonds on net. 
In the case where banks are net holders of bonds, the supply of loans is 
1 = A(&)(I -  7,)m.  (9) 
In the case where banks are net issuers of bonds, the supply of loans is 
Note that if the reserve requirement on bond issues is zero, then equations (9) 
and (10) are the same. Thus in the rest of this section, we assume that reserves 
1. Bernanke and Blinder (1988)  assume that the desired fraction of the bank’s nonreserve portfo- 
lio held in the form of loans is a function of the rates of interest on loans and bonds separately. 
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are held on net bond issues and then discuss the cases where no such reserves 
are held by setting rz  to zero. 
Equating the supply and demand for loans yields 
Equations (l),  (6),  and (1  1) determine the levels of y, i, and 6 given the level 
of  rn. Totally differentiating the three equations, the effect of a change in the 
money supply on output is 
~___- 
1 
This equation shows the effects of  an open-market sale that reduces m and 
raises either bb  or bP,  holding w constant, when both a lending channel and a 
money channel are operational. 
8.1.2  Simplifying Assumptions 
We now add further assumptions to simplify expression (12). We begin with 
the interest elasticities of the nonbank public’s demands for different assets. 
Starting from the nonbank sector’s holdings of nominally denominated assets, 
we have the usual adding up constraint 
(13)  0 = Bf + Di  -  Li, 
where Bp(.) is the nonbank public’s demand for bonds. Dividing by  the total 
amount of deposits and rearranging gives 
This equation relates the  percentage change in deposits in response to  an 
interest-rate increase to the percentage changes in loan and bond holdings in 
response to an interest-rate increase and to the relative sizes of the three nomi- 
nal assets held by  the nonbank sector. When interest rates rise, the nonbank 
public wants to hold less money. It can accomplish this by holding more bonds 
(Bf > 0) or fewer loans (L,  < 0) or both. 
To go further, we assume that the percentage changes in the holdings of the 
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The relationship  between the interest elasticities of money and loan demand 
is therefore 
4 = (9) (L). 
1  l+bu 
Substituting this expression into equation (12) eliminates one term in the nu- 
merator. 
We now turn to the income elasticities of money, loan, and bond demand. 
The adding up constraint means that 
(17)  0 = Be  + Dv -  L,,. 
The standard assumption is that D>  is positive, and we add the assumption that 
in response to an increase in income, bond and loan demand adjust by the same 
percentage, so 
We thus derive an expression for the relationship between the income elasticit- 
ies of money and loan demand analogous to (16) above, 
rn 
Combining (16) and (19) gives 
(20)  DiL, = LiDv, 
which  eliminates one term in  the denominator of  the expression  for dy/dm 
derived above.* 
Incorporating these assumptions about elasticities, the derivative of output 
with respect to money becomes 
This expression shows the effects of money on output when a lending channel 
is operational, assuming our simplifying assumptions are approximately cor- 
rect. Several comments about this expression are in order. 
The conditions  for a lending  channel  to be operational  are that  A,  < 00, 
2. The conditions under which the last term in the denominator drops out are more general than 
the assumptions made here. For example, rather than assuming that private bond  holdings and 
loans both adjust by the same percentage (in response to changes in either i or y),  we could assume 
that the ratio of  their percentage adjustments is the same in either case. 269  Historical Perspectives on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
L, > --m,  and Y, < 0. If any of these conditions fails to hold, then (21) col- 
lapses to (3). The first of these conditions states that banks do not regard loans 
and bonds as perfect substitutes in their portfolios; the second states that firms 
do not regard loans and bonds as perfect substitutes in their portfolios; and the 
third states that firms’ investment decisions depend on both the loan and bond 
interest rates. 
The condition for money to have a greater effect on output when the lending 
channel is operational (that is, the condition for the expression in [21] to ex- 
ceed the expression in [3]) is that 
(22)  b  + 1 -  m>  0. 
Since this term can be positive or negative, the lending channel can exacerbate 
or moderate the money channel’s effect on output. From the bank’s balance 
sheet, 
(23)  l-m= -bb-  r. 
So, the condition for the lending channel to exacerbate the effect of money on 
output is that 
(24)  bh + r < b. 
We assume in what follows that this condition is satisfied. 
8.1.3  The Determinants of dy/dm 
Having laid out the basic model, we now consider how observable features 
of the institutional and financial structure of the economy are likely to affect 
the impact of money on output, assuming a lending channel is operational. Our 
discussion focuses on two broad areas: the structure of bank balance sheets 
and the structure of firm finance. 
The first factor likely to determine the magnitude of money’s effect on out- 
put is the structure of bank assets. Assuming that condition (24) is satisfied, 
dy/dm is largest when  A,lA  is small, that is, when banks do not adjust the 
fraction of their assets made up of loans in response to a change in the loan- 
bond  differential. Under the  assumption that A,  does not vary  significantly 
with A, this would imply that dy/dm is increasing in the fraction of their portfo- 
lios that banks hold in loans. 
More generally, the effect of changes in A on ASIA depends on the underly- 
ing model of bank portfolio preferences. One case where one can determine 
the magnitude of A,IA  is when there is a significant reserve requirement on the 
issue of bonds by banks, and A (the fraction of the bank’s portfolio made up of 
loans) is near one. In this case banks are likely to be at a comer, where the 
marginal cost of one less loan (the interest rate on holding bonds, which is the 
opportunity cost of making loans) could be much less than the marginal cost 
of one more loan (that is, the bond interest rate adjusted for the cost of holding 
reserves against bond issue). In such a case, the elasticity of the portfolio share 270  Jeffrey A. Miron, Christina D. Romer, and David N. Weil 
with respect to the loan-bond differential is likely to be near zero, and thus, 
other factors held constant, dy/dm should be large. 
The second factor affecting the size of dy/dm is the structure of firm finance. 
Expression (21) indicates that the fraction of firms’ capital coming from loans 
relative to bonds likely affects the magnitude of the lending channel by chang- 
ing the semielasticity of loan demand with respect to the loan-bond differen- 
tial, LJl. As loans increase as a fraction of firm finance, we expect L$l  to fall, 
thus increasing dy/dm. 
A third factor in the size of dy/dm is the relative size of the sensitivities of 
investment to the bond interest rate and to the loan-bond differential. Holding 
Y, constant, an increase in the ratio of  Y, to  Y, raises the value of dyldm. This 
ratio will be affected both by  the different fractions of  investment being fi- 
nanced at the loan and bond rates and by the potential for substitution between 
the two. If, for example, “small” firms invest using loans while “large” firms 
invest using bonds, if there is no substitution between the two sources of  fi- 
nancing, and if  the two size firms have the same interest elasticity of  invest- 
ment, then YJY.  will just equal the fraction of firms that are small. Differences 
in the interest elasticities of  investment between large and small firms will 
affect the ratio of  Y, to y. If small firms are more interest sensitive than large 
firms, dy/dm will be bigger. Finally, if  firms are able to substitute between 
loans and bonds in their financing, this will reduce Y, and thus reduce dy/dm. 
8.2  Changes in Financial Structure 
According to the model presented in section 8.1, changes in the financial 
structure of  the economy have  important implications for the importance of 
the lending channel in the transmission of monetary shocks. Therefore, to see 
whether the importance of the lending channel is likely to have changed over 
time in the United States, we examine evidence on how various aspects of 
financial structure have changed between 1900 and 1988. In particular, we look 
at structural changes in the balance sheets of banks and firms. 
The major finding of this analysis of institutions is that the lending channel 
of  the monetary transmission mechanism should have  been  stronger before 
1929 than in the first two decades after 1945. We  find that important changes 
in financial structure occurred between the pre-Depression and post-World 
War I1 eras and that, at least up through 1970, essentially all of these changes 
imply a weakening of the lending channel. After 1970 the evidence is more 
complicated, with some changes further weakening the lending channel and 
others potentially strengthening it. 
8.2.1  Banks 
Assets 
Annual data on bank balance sheets from 1896 to the present are available 
from the Federal Reserve. These data reflect a major effort by  the Federal Re- 271  Historical Perspectives on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
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Fig. 8.1  Ratio of bank loans to total interest-bearing bank assets, 18961988 
Note:  Real estate loans are excluded from bank loans. 
serve to adjust the historical statistics for the prewar era (from the Comptroller 
of the Currency) to be as consistent as possible with postwar statistics. This 
adjustment mainly involves inflating the data for nonnational banks to compen- 
sate for underreporting by state banks in the period before 1938. In this section 
we use the version of the Federal Reserve data corresponding to all commer- 
cial banks.3 
Figure 8.1 shows the ratio of total bank loans less real estate loans to total 
interest-bearing bank assets for 1896 to 1988. This ratio declined slowly over 
the first three decades of the twentieth century, from 72 percent in 1896 to 60 
percent in  1929. It then fell dramatically during the Great Depression and 
World War 11,  reaching 17 percent in  1945. Between  1945 and  1970 it rose 
steadily, reaching 27 percent in 1950, 46 percent in  1960, and 53 percent in 
1970. Since 1970 non-real  estate loans as a fraction of total bank assets have 
hovered around 52 percent. 
Mirroring this fall over time in the loan ratio is a rise over time in the fraction 
of bank assets accounted for by government securities. Government securities 
accounted for between 5 and 7 percent of interest-bearing bank assets during 
most of  the pre-World  War I era. After the war this number was higher; in 
1929, for example, government securities accounted for  10 percent of  total 
assets. During World War I1 banks increased their holdings of U.S. government 
securities by a factor of four. This came on top of a threefold increase between 
1929 and 1936. As a result, government securities accounted for 73 percent of 
total interest-bearing assets in 1945. Banks’ holdings of government securities 
then fell steadily in the first two decades of  the postwar era as loans rose. 
However, as the behavior of the loan ratio suggests, the fraction of bank assets 
3. The data for 1896-1970  are from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, ser. X588-X609).  Data 
after 1970 are from the Annual Statistical Digest of the Federal Reserve for various years. For all 
years we use total loans excluding interbank loans. Data prior to 1970  are for June 30 or the nearest 
available date; data thereafter are for the last Wednesday in June. 272  Jeffrey A. Miron, Christina D. Romer, and David N. Weil 
accounted for by government securities never returned to its pre-World  War I 
level; in 1988 government securities were still 14 percent of total bank assets. 
This pattern suggests that loans were, on average, a substantially larger frac- 
tion of total interest-bearing bank assets in the pre-Depression era than in the 
post-World  War I1 period. Even at the postwar peak, the fraction of bank assets 
accounted for by non-real  estate loans was more than ten percentage points 
smaller than the average fraction in the pre- 1929 period. In terms of the model 
given in section 8.1, holding other factors constant, this change implies that 
the lending channel was substantially more important before  1929 than after 
1945  .4 
The implications of the low loan holdings during the period 1929-1944  are 
harder to determine because the period is short and dominated by the Great 
Depression. The plummeting of the fraction of bank assets accounted for by 
loans between  1929 and  1936 almost surely reflects  the tremendous  fall in 
output, rather than some instantaneous change in the importance of the lending 
channel. Thus, a reasonable view is that the lending channel was as important 
during the declining phase of the Depression  as it was in the three decades 
before  1929. On the other hand, after the recovery was firmly under way,  it 
seems possible that the continued low loan ratios, including the additional de- 
clines associated with World War 11,  imply that the lending channel was con- 
siderably weaker in the late 1930s and early 1940s than previously. Once banks 
had  switched so thoroughly out of  loans and into other assets, a decline in 
reserves should have had less effect on bank lending. 
Liabilities 
The structure and level of reserve requirements has changed dramatically 
over time. Figure 8.2a shows the ratio of the reserve requirement on time de- 
posits to the reserve  requirement on demand deposits over the  last century. 
Figure 8.2b shows the level of the reserve requirement on time deposits. Con- 
struction of these figures is somewhat complicated due to changes in the defi- 
nition  of  time deposits  and to the  variation  in  state regulations  before  the 
founding of the Federal Reserve in  1914. For the period before 1917, we ana- 
lyze reserve requirements for national banks, as set by the National Banking 
Act of  1864 and various amendments. These figures are also complicated by 
the fact that the definition of deposits was changed substantially by the Mone- 
tary Control Act of 1980.5 
4. In the preceding discussion we examined total loans less real estate loans. This measure was 
motivated by  the presumption that most real estate loans are to households and that the lending 
channel works mainly through loans to firms.  However, if one includes real estate loans the results 
are qualitatively similar. The only difference is that the loan ratio including real estate loans nearly 
reaches pre-1929 levels in the 1980s. 
5. The data on reserve requirements under the National Banking Act are from Bordo, Rappaport, 
and Schwartz (1992,211). The data for 1917-80 are from U.S. Board of Governors of  the Federal 
Reserve System (1983, 236-37).  For the period  1917-62,  we use the reserve requirements on 273  Historical Perspectives on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
Under the National Banking Act no distinction  was drawn between time 
deposits and demand deposits; there was a uniform reserve requirement on all 
deposits. Thus, the ratio of the reserve requirement on time deposits to that on 
demand deposits for national banks was one from 1874 until the founding of 
the Federal Reserve. Effective in 1917, the Federal Reserve Act distinguished 
between time and demand deposits, setting the ratio of  the reserve require- 
ments on the two at an initial level of roughly one to three. Though there was 
some variation in this ratio during the interwar and early postwar eras, it re- 
mained at roughly one to three until the mid-1960s. The relative size of  the 
requirement on time deposits was lowered significantly in 1967, and the ratio 
hovered around 9k through the 1970s. After 1980 the ratio rose to %,  but this 
change is somewhat hard to interpret because of the change in the definition 
of deposits. 
The change in the ratio of reserve requirements on time and demand depos- 
its in the postwar era is even more dramatic if one considers special time de- 
posits rather than ordinary savings accounts. An important development of the 
1960s was the advent of certificates of  deposit.6 While CDs had roughly the 
same reserve requirements as savings deposits in the late 1960s, in the 1970s 
their reserve requirement fell from 3 percent to 1 percent. In 1980, under the 
Monetary Control Act, the reserve requirement on CDs over a certain level was 
set to zero. As a result of this change, banks in the late 1970s and 1980s had a 
way of raising funds that was free of reserve limitations. 
The level of the reserve requirement  on time deposits follows almost the 
same pattern as the ratio of the reserve requirement on time deposits to that on 
demand deposits. Under the National Banking Act the reserve requirement on 
time deposits was not only the same as that on demand deposits, it was also 
very high (25 percent). With the advent of the Federal Reserve,  the reserve 
requirement on time deposits fell dramatically (to 3 percent). This level rose 
somewhat during the Great Depression and the early postwar era (to between 
5 and 7.5 percent), before returning to 3 percent in 1967. Once again, if special 
time deposits are considered rather than savings accounts, changes occur again 
in  1975 and  1980 when  the reserve requirement  on CDs was lowered and 
then eliminated. 
As mentioned  above, the discussion of  reserve requirements  for the pre- 
World War I era is complicated by the presence of state banks that were subject 
to individual state reserve requirements. In the period before World War I there 
demand deposits for reserve city banks and time deposits for all classes of banks. For the period 
1966-72  we use the requirements on demand deposits for reserve city banks with deposits over 
$5 million and on savings deposits. For 1972-80,  we use the requirements on net demand deposits 
for banks with deposits over $400 million and on savings deposits. After 1980, we use the require- 
ments on net transactions accounts over $28.9 million and on nonpersonal time deposits of  matu- 
rity less than one and one-half years. 
6. Kaufman (1992, 62) states that CDs “were developed in 1961 to provide commercial banks 
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Fig. 8.2  Reserve requirements, 1874-1991 
was substantial variation in state regulations. Before detailing the differences 
between state and national bank regulations, it is important to note that national 
banks account for a large fraction of total bank assets in the early period. Na- 
tional banks accounted for 42 percent of total bank assets in 1896 and 43 per- 
cent in  1910.7  Thus, nearly half of bank deposits in the prewar era certainly 
had equal reserve requirements on demand and time deposits. 
A  systematic  study  of  state  reserve  requirement  legislation  by  Rodkey 
(1934) indicates that most state banks had similar reserve requirements on de- 
mand and time deposits during the period before the founding of the Federal 
Reserve. However, Rodkey lists eleven states that passed legislation  distin- 
7. The data on national and nonnational hank assets are from US.  Bureau of the Census (1975, 
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guishing between the different types of deposits in the setting of  reserve re- 
quirements. These states were (in the order of the date of legislation) Maine, 
New Hampshire, Nebraska, Iowa, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Con- 
necticut, Vermont, Utah, and Colorado. In most of these states, however, the 
ratio of  the reserve requirement on time deposits to that on demand deposits 
was much closer to one than in the post-Federal  Reserve period, and the level 
of reserve requirements on time deposits was substantial. For example, in the 
Pennsylvania statute passed in 1907, the reserve requirement on time deposits 
was 7.5 percent and that on demand deposits was 15 percent. In the Utah stat- 
ute passed in 1911, the reserve requirement on time deposits was 10 percent 
and that on demand deposits was 15 percent. 
Those states that had similar reserve requirements on time deposits and de- 
mand deposits typically set fairly high reserve requirements. A study by Well- 
don (1909) of state regulations in 1909 found that reserve requirements on time 
and demand deposits in state banks were usually between 15 and 25 percent. 
However, Welldon found that in 1909, fourteen states had zero reserve require- 
ments on both time and demand deposits. Since reserve requirements were 
becoming more common over time, the number of states with no reserve re- 
quirements was surely much larger in the 1870s and 1880s. 
Given that the majority of  state banks set equal and high reserve require- 
ments on time and demand deposits in the pre-Federal  Reserve era, it is rea- 
sonable to conclude that the ratio of  the reserve requirement on time deposits 
to that on demand deposits fell substantially between the pre-1914 era and the 
interwar and postwar periods. Furthermore, within the post-World  War I1 pe- 
riod, the ratio fell even more. The level of reserve requirements on time depos- 
its almost surely showed the same pattern. 
To look directly at the importance of time deposits to bank balance sheets, 
figure 8.3a presents the ratio of time deposits to total interest-bearing assets of 
commercial banks.* The relative  size of  time deposits, though  small, rose 
through the pre-Federal  Reserve period and continued to rise through the onset 
of the Depression. The relative magnitude of time deposits fell during World 
War  11,  but then rose swiftly during the postwar period, with time deposits 
(including CDs) becoming the dominant liability of commercial banks in the 
1970s and 1980s. 
The change in the structure of reserve requirements over time and the corre- 
sponding rise in the importance of time deposits suggest that the lending chan- 
nel should have been weakened between the pre-1914 and post-World  War I1 
periods. In the pre-Federal  Reserve era, banks had little opportunity to raise 
funds to counteract a fall in reserves because all deposits were covered by the 
same reserve requirements. Thus, loans had to contract in response to a fall in 
reserves. In contrast. in the 1980s banks could issue CDs which have no reserve 
8. Data on time deposits, which include CDs and savings accounts, for 1896-1970  are from 
US.  Bureau of the Census, 1975, ser. 606; data for 197  1-90  are from the Federal Reserve’s Annual 
Srutistical Digesf.  All data are for the end of  June or the last Wednesday in June. 276  Jeffrey A. Miron, Christina D. Romer, and David N. Weil 
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Fig. 8.3  Composition of bank portfolios, 1896-1988 
requirement. As a result, loans no longer need to fall in response to a decline 
in reserves. 
Figure 8.3b plots our summary measure of banks’ portfolios, X,  which is the 
ratio of  loans to net interest bearing assets (loans plus net bond holdings). 
During the period before the Great Depression, X remained near one, reflecting 
the fact that banks’ net holdings of  bonds were near zero. During the first 
part of this period, when there were substantial reserve requirements on time 
deposits, we suspect that banks were at a comer with respect to the fraction of 
their net assets made up of loans. More generally, the fact that X was so near 
to one and  showed so little variation suggests that banks were reluctant to 
change the composition of  their  portfolios in  response, for example, to  a 
change in the loan-bond differential. In such a case, according to the model 
laid out above, the lending channel will be particularly potent. Over the post- 277  Historical Perspectives on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
war period, A  rose steadily, reflecting both an increase in loans on the asset 
side and an increase in time deposits as liabilities. The effect of these changes 
in A on the importance of the lending channel in the postwar era is ambiguous. 
On the one hand, the high values of  X  in the latter half of  the period might 
suggest that AJA  was  small and the lending channel was important. On the 
other hand, the large range of  values over which A varied might suggest that 
banks were not reluctant to adjust their portfolios, and thus that the lending 
channel was not important. 
8.2.2  Firms 
According to the model given in section 8.1, changes in the composition of 
firm finance and the relative size of  large and small firms over time would 
cause the importance of  the  lending channel of  monetary  transmission to 
change as well. If firms use fewer loans relative to other liabilities to finance 
investment, this should decrease the importance of  the lending channel. This 
is true because a lower emphasis on loan finance means that firms are less 
sensitive to changes in the loan-bond interest differential. Since small firms are 
likely to be more constrained in their alternatives to bank credit, a fall in the 
proportion of firms that are small implies that the lending channel is likely to 
have become less important 
Aggregate Behavior 
Perhaps the simplest measure of the importance of bank loans in the financ- 
ing of firms is the ratio of total bank loans (less real estate loans) to the capital 
stock. This measure provides an indication of whether bank loans grew faster, 
slower, or at just the same rate as the capital which such loans are designed to 
finance. The data on total non-real  estate bank loans are taken from the balance 
sheet for all commercial banks described above. The capital stock series used 
shows the net stock of  fixed, nonresidential private capital.l0 Since the loan 
series is in current dollars, we use the current-cost valuation capital stock se- 
ries as well. Because the capital stock series starts in 1925, we can look only 
at the ratio starting at the end of the pre-Depression era. 
Figure 8.4 shows the ratio of total non-real  estate bank loans to the capital 
stock. As can be  seen, in the late 1920s this ratio was between 26  and 29 
percent. During the Depression, the ratio plummeted as loans fell dramatically. 
The ratio remained below 20 percent until  1960. During the early  1970s, it 
reached levels close to the typical value in the late 1920s. In the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, the ratio of loans to the capital stock fell again, to values close to 
20 percent. This picture certainly suggests that loans were a more important 
source of firm finance at the end of the pre-Depression era than in the postwar 
9. Gertler and Gilchrist (1991)  and Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) suggest that monetary contrac- 
10. These data are described in U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (1974). We  use the most 
tions affect the economy by reducing the availability of bank loans to small firms. 
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Fig. 8.4  Ratio of bank loans to the capital stock, 1925-88 
era. However, what happened during the early years of the twentieth century 
cannot be discerned. 
The fact that bank loans have not grown as rapidly as the capital stock at an 
aggregate level since 1925 is important because it provides a way of gauging 
the plausibility of the sectoral balance sheets discussed below. Given the aggre- 
gate behavior of loans, it would be impossible for several important sectors to 
show a marked increase in the importance of bank loans unless other sectors 
show a substantial decline. At a more fundamental level, the decline in the 
aggregate importance of bank loans over time suggests that the lending channel 
of monetary transmission is likely to have become less important over time. If 
more capital was financed using bank loans in the pre-1929 era than in the 
postwar era, it is likely that the lending channel was stronger in the past than 
today. 
Corporations 
More detailed information about the importance of bank lending in the fi- 
nancing of firms can be found in the sectoral balance sheet of the nonfinancial 
corporate sector and the nonfarm, unincorporated business sector of the U.S. 
economy. The annual balance sheet data are constructed by  merging the data 
from Goldsmith, Lipsey, and Mendelson  (1963) for selected years between 
1900-45 with those from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve 
for 1945-90. The data from Goldsmith, Lipsey, and Mendelson, while similar 
in concept to those of the Federal Reserve, differ in many practical ways from 
the  modern  data.  Furthermore, the  Flow  of  Funds  data  from the  Federal 
Reserve on assets and liabilities have been revised over time, so that data from 
the early postwar era are not strictly comparable with more recent data. To 
deal with these problems of comparability, we make several adjustments to the 
various series. These adjustments are described in the appendix. 
The bank loans n.e.c. (not elsewhere classified) entry in the sectoral balance 279  Historical Perspectives on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
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Fig. 8.5  Ratio of loans to total liabilities for corporations, 1900-89 
Note: Before 1945 data are available only for starred observations; after 1945 the data are 
annual. 
sheet is the best available measure of total bank loans to corporations. There 
are surely other bank loans made to corporations, but they are lumped in with 
the loans of other financial intermediaries in such categories as mortgages and 
loans on securities. To gauge the changes in the importance of bank loans, we 
compare bank loans with the sum of total liabilities of corporations, less trade 
debt and the market value of corporate equities. While gross trade debt is typi- 
cally included in total liabilities, it is not a large net source of finance for the 
corporate sector because firms owe most of  it to each other. Therefore, we 
exclude gross trade debt from total liabilities. Figure 8.5 shows the ratio of 
bank loans n.e.c. to total liabilities less trade debt plus equities for nonfinan- 
cia1 corporations. 
This graph shows that the loan ratio of Corporations rose over the course of 
the pre-Depression era, from  11 percent in  1900 to  14 percent in 1922. By 
1929, however, it had fallen back to 8 percent because of the explosion in the 
market value of corporate equities. It then fell further during the Depression, 
reaching 6 percent in  1933. The corporate loan ratio started the postwar era 
fairly high, reaching 11 percent in 1947, but then dropped substantially in the 
1950s. During the 1950s and 1960s, the ratio hovered around 7 percent. It then 
rose in the  1970s, but, with the exception of  1974, it did not reach its pre- 
Depression peak value. Based on this graph, it appears that the loan ratio for 
corporations was noticeably higher in the pre-Depression era than in the first 
two decades of the postwar era. After 1970, loans increased in importance, but 
they are still less important than in the first decades of the 1900s. 
The decreased role of  bank loans in the postwar era has various sources. 
One widely cited change in corporate finance between the pre-World  War I 
era and the interwar and postwar periods is the expansion of  the commercjal 
paper market (see, for example, Cargill 1991, 140, and Greef 1938). However, 280  Jeffrey A. Miron, Christina D. Romer, and David N. Weil 
even though the commercial paper market expanded significantly, especially 
after 1960, it is still a very small fraction of total liabilities. Thus, it is not the 
main source of the decreased importance of loans. The more important change 
is  the  expansion of  corporate equities. Corporate equities increased much 
faster between the pre-1929 and postwar eras than did loans or total liabilities 
(less trade debt). Indeed, the ratio of loans to total liabilities (less trade debt) 
was roughly the same in the early 1900s and the early postwar era." Thus, the 
main source of the decline in the importance of bank finance for corporations 
is the expansion of equity finance. 
Unincorporated Businesses 
As described in the appendix, the balance sheet for nonfarm, unincorporated 
businesses cannot be made consistent over time. However, the data from Gold- 
smith, Lipsey, and Mendelson for 1900 to 1945 show some interesting trends. 
Figure 8.6 shows the ratio of  bank loans to total liabilities (less trade debt) 
for unincorporated businesses before 1945. As with corporate finance, loans 
became a much smaller fraction of  total liabilities of  unincorporated busi- 
nesses beginning in 1929 and this decline continued through the Great Depres- 
sion. The decline in the loans to total liabilities ratio was also substantially 
larger for unincorporated businesses than for corporations. The level to which 
the loan ratio for unincorporated businesses returned in  1945 is much lower 
than its pre-Depression level. While one would not want to deduce a postwar 
trend from 1945 alone, there is certainly no evidence of a rapid postwar expan- 
sion of bank loan finance for unincorporated businesses. 
As mentioned above, the ratio of  total bank loans to the capital stock im- 
poses some constraints on what could plausibly have happened to the impor- 
tance of loans for the unincorporated business sector over the postwar era. We 
know that bank loans became less important at an aggregate level in financing 
the capital stock between the prewar era and the first two decades of the post- 
war era. After 1970, bank loans increased in importance, but loans were still a 
less important form of finance than in the pre-Depression era. The loan ratio 
of corporations shows exactly the same pattern as the aggregate ratio. There- 
fore, unless some other sector showed a great decrease in the importance of 
loans, the unincorporated business sector could not have greatly increased its 
loan ratio over the postwar era. 
The fact that in the postwar era bank loans have become a smaller fraction 
of total liabilities, certainly for corporations and probably for unincorporated 
businesses, makes it likely that the lending channel of the transmission mecha- 
nism has weakened over time. In terms of our model, if there are more substi- 
tutes for bank loans in the postwar era than in the pre-1929 era, then the sensi- 
tivity of  investment to the loan-bond spread should have diminished. This in 
11. The ratio of  loans to total liabilities, including gross trade debt, shows a noticeable fall 
between the pre-Depression and postwar eras. This is because trade debt has also expanded rapidly. 281  Historical Perspectives on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
Fig. 8.6  Ratio of loans to total liabilities for unincorporated businesses, 
190045 
Note: Data are available only for starred observations. 
turn implies that the relative importance of  the lending channel should have 
declined as well. 
The fact that loans have become a more important source of  firm finance 
over the course of the postwar era suggests that the relative importance of the 
lending channel may not have been constant between 1945 and 1990. Indeed, 
judging just from the facts about firm finance, it appears quite likely that the 
lending channel became more important after 1970 than it was in the 1950s 
and 1960s, though not as important as in the pre-Depression era. 
Relative Size of Corporations and Unincorporated Businesses 
While  the  classification of  particular liabilities for unincorporated busi- 
nesses cannot be made consistent over time, the data for total liabilities and 
equities do appear to be comparable across time periods. Therefore, it is pos- 
sible to use this information to gauge the relative size of  the corporate and 
unincorporated sectors.  l2 Since corporations are typically much larger than un- 
incorporated businesses, this comparison can give some indication of changes 
in the distribution of  large and small firms over time. Figure 8.7 graphs the 
ratio of total liabilities (less gross trade debt) of unincorporated businesses to 
the sum of  total liabilities (again, less gross trade debt) of  corporations and 
corporate equities. 
Judging from this measure, the corporate sector grew more rapidly than the 
unincorporated sector between 1900 and 1945; the ratio of  total liabilities of 
unincorporated businesses to total liabilities plus equities of corporations fell 
12. Total assets would be a more obvious way to compare the sizes of  the two sectors. Unfonu- 
nately, the balance sheets give only total financial assets, which are not a good indicator of rela- 
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Fig. 8.7  Ratio of total liabilities of unincorporated businesses to total liabilities 
of corporations, 1900-89 
Nute: Before 1945 data are available only for starred observations; after 1945 the data are 
annual. 
steadily over this period. In the early postwar era, the ratio hovered at roughly 
the same level as in  1929. After  1970, this ratio rose substantially, reflecting 
the greater growth of total liabilities for unincorporated businesses. 
If this ratio truly reflects the relative size of the two sectors, and if the lend- 
ing channel is more important the larger the bank-dependent unincorporated 
sector, then the fall in the ratio between 1900 and 1945 suggests that the lend- 
ing channel of monetary transmission was weakening over this period. It then 
remained at its 1929 level during the early postwar era. The subsequent rise in 
the relative size of  the two sectors suggests that the lending channel has be- 
come more important again in the last two decades. 
8.2.3  Summary 
Taken together, the various changes in the structure of financial institutions 
suggest that the lending channel should have decreased in importance between 
the pre-1929 and the post-1945 eras. Both the structure of bank balance sheets 
and the structure of firm balance sheets suggest that loans were more important 
before the Great Depression than after. Within the pre-Depression era, the dif- 
ferentiation of reserve requirements on time deposits and demand deposits and 
the large decline in the level of reserve requirements on time deposits at the 
time of the founding of the Federal Reserve suggest that the lending channel 
should have been stronger before 1914 than after. 
Within the postwar era, the fact that bank loans have become a larger frac- 
tion of total bank assets and total firm liabilities after 1970 than in the first two 
decades of  the postwar era suggests that the lending channel may have been 
increasing in importance. The relative importance of unincorporated (and pre- 
sumably bank-dependent) businesses also rose in the second half of the post- 
World War  I1 era, again suggesting an increased importance of the lending 283  Historical Perspectives on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
channel. However, the ratio of the reserve requirement on time deposits to that 
on demand deposits and the level of reserve requirements on time deposits fell 
in the late postwar era, and time deposits and CDs rose to become the dominant 
liability of commercial banks over the postwar period. These factors would 
tend to lessen the importance of the lending channel. Thus, while it is clear 
that the lending channel should have weakened between the pre-Depression 
era and early postwar eras, the relative strength of the lending channel in the 
early and late postwar eras is ambiguous. 
8.3  Historical Evidence on the Lending Channel 
In this section we examine the behavior since the late nineteenth century of 
various indicators of the strength of the lending channel. In particular, we look 
at the spread between the loan and bond rates, the mix of credit market instru- 
ments between loans and commercial paper, and the correlation between out- 
put and lending. The analysis of section 8.1 and previous analytical work sug- 
gest that these measures should behave differently after monetary contractions 
than in more ordinary times if the lending channel is important. Since the insti- 
tutional analysis of section 8.2 suggests that the strength of the lending channel 
should have declined over time, our hypothesis is that the response of these 
variables to monetary shocks should have declined as well. If they have not, 
this could either be evidence that these measures of the strength of the lending 
channel are not very good, or evidence that the lending channel has not been 
important in any era. 
Since the response of these variables to monetary contractions is the meas- 
ure of the strength of the lending channel, identifying monetary contractions 
is an important step in the analysis. The monetary contractions that we con- 
sider consist of three pre-Federal  Reserve financial panics (1890:8, 1893:5, 
and  1907:  10);  four  interwar  contractions  consisting  of  Friedman  and 
Schwartz’s (1963) three crucial experiments plus the bank holiday (1920: 1, 
1931:10, 1933:2, and 1937:l); and seven post-World  War I1 episodes identi- 
fied by Romer and Romer (1989, 1994) as anti-inflation interventions by the 
Federal  Reserve  (1947:  10, 1955:9,  1968:12,  1974:4, 1978:8,  1979:  10, and 
1988:  12). The extent to which each of these episodes constitutes an exogenous 
monetary contraction has been debated at length elsewhere (Friedman 1989; 
Schwartz 1989; Hoover and Perez 1994; Dotsey and Reid  1992); we do not 
repeat that discussion here. 
8.3.1  The Spread 
According to the model presented above, one key indicator of the strength 
of  the lending channel is 6, the spread between loan rates and bond rates. In 
response to a monetary contraction, the spread should increase as banks con- 
tract loans, and thus force firms to use bonds as an imperfect, alternate source 
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Fig. 8.8  Loan-bond interest-rate  spread and monetary contractions, 1890-1991 
Note:  Vertical lines denote the dates of negative monetary shocks. 
fying assumptions used there, the response of the spread to a change in the 
money stock is 
The factors that imply a large response of the spread to money are a subset of 
those that lead to a large value of dy/dm in equation (21) above. The less will- 
ing banks and firms are to substitute between loans and bonds in response to 
changes in the spread, the larger the effect of money will be on the spread. 286  Jeffrey A. Miron, Christina D. Romer, and David N. Weil 
Similarly, in the case where banks are net issuers of bonds, the larger the re- 
serve requirement on CDs and time deposits, the larger the effect of money on 
the spread. On the other hand, the sensitivities of investment to the bond inter- 
est rate and to the spread, which affect the size of  dy/dm, do not affect the 
sensitivity of the spread to money shocks. 
Data 
Figure 8.8 presents a measure of the spread for the period 1890-1991. The 
loan rate series is the time-loan rate on six-month time loans for the period 
1890-1918, the rate charged on customer loans by banks in principal cities for 
the period 1919-27, the rate charged on commercial loans by  banks in princi- 
pal cities for the period  1928-39,  and the prime interest rate for the period 
1947-91.13 The bond rate series is for six-month prime commercial paper. All 
data are quarterly averages of monthly data. The figure indicates that the spread 
rose on average over the forty years prior to the Great Depression and that 
it was generally higher in the second half of  the postwar period than  in the 
first half. 
Results 
Rather than focus on long-term trends in the spread, we instead look at the 
behavior of  the spread in monetary contractions. Figure 8.8 also shows the 
dates of  negative monetary  shocks so that we  can evaluate the path of  the 
spread  following each of  the fourteen monetary  contractions we  consider. 
Given the model presented in section 8.1, one should expect the spread to 
increase following monetary  contractions. Given the evidence presented in 
section 8.2, and assuming that the magnitude of monetary contractions has 
been roughly similar over time, one should expect relatively large increases in 
the spread following pre-1929 monetary contractions and relatively modest 
increases in the spread following early postwar  contraction^.'^ 
The data presented in the figure do not bear out these expectations. Note 
first that, looking across the entire sample, the spread does not consistently 
increase following monetary contractions. In nine of fourteen cases, the spread 
remains approximately unchanged or decreases slightly during the two years 
following the onset of a contraction. In three of the five cases where the spread 
does increase, the magnitude of this increase is only about one hundred basis 
points. The two episodes that display significant increases in the magnitude of 
the spread are dominated by the second quarter of 1980, when the Fed imposed 
credit controls that limited the rate of growth of bank lending (Schreft 1990; 
13. The time loan rate data are from Mankiw, Miron, and Weil(l987, 1990). The customer and 
commercial loan rate data are from US.  Board of Governors (1976a. 463-64,  tables 124-25).  The 
prime rate data are from Data Resources, Inc. (DRI). 
14. The fact that consistent measures of aggregate output and unemployment show that reces- 
sions were of roughly the same size before  1929 and after 1945 is one indicator that monetary 
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Owens and Schreft 1992). Averaging over the entire sample, the spread in- 
creases by only twenty-one basis points at the one-year horizon and by thirty- 
nine basis points at the two-year h0riz0n.l~ 
Figure 8.9 shows the average behavior of the spread in each of four subsam- 
ples corresponding to different “lending regimes.” The first regime is 1890- 
1929, the second is 1930-38,  the third is 1947-70,  and the fourth is 1971-91. 
According to the evidence presented in section 8.2, one ought to expect the 
most dramatic response of the spread during the pre-1929 period and the least 
dramatic during the 1947-70 period, assuming the magnitude of monetary con- 
tractions is roughly similar across the regimes. 
The differences in the response of the spread across regimes only partially 
bear out this expectation. At the one-year horizon, the spread increases on aver- 
age by one basis point during the 1890-1929 regime, falls by twenty-five basis 
points during the 1947-70  regime, and rises by sixty-two basis points during 
the 1971-91  regime. Thus, while post-World  War I1 changes in the response 
of  the spread to monetary contractions are consistent with the evidence pre- 
sented in section 8.2, the difference in the behavior of the spread in the pre- 
Depression and post-World  War I1 periods is not. 
Changes in the Commercial Paper Market 
Given that the spread does not consistently rise after monetary contractions 
in the pre-World  War I and interwar eras, it is reasonable to ask whether there 
have been changes in the commercial paper market that could make this vari- 
able a less reliable indicator of the strength of the credit channel before World 
War I1 than after. Our judgment is that there have not. 
This is not to say that the commercial paper market has not changed over 
time. Most obviously, it has grown tremendously. Much of  this growth has 
been in commercial paper issued by  finance companies and directly placed, 
which is not considered  in  this paper.I6 Nevertheless, the nominal value of 
dealer-placed commercial paper increased by a factor of roughly 230 between 
December 19  19 and December 199  1. For comparison, the nominal value of 
bank loans increased by a factor of roughly 95 over the same period. This rapid 
growth, however, does not imply that the early commercial paper market was 
backward. According to Greef (1938), by  1890 the commercial paper market 
was national in scope and dominated by  large commercial paper houses that 
were efficient and modern. 
15. Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) report that in both bivariate VARs and trivariate VARs 
that include GNP, Romer dates or Romer dates plus a 1966 credit-crunch dummy are statistically 
significant predictors of  the interest-rate spread considered here. Their sample period is 1963-89. 
The results given above suggest that the Kashyap-Stein-Wilcox results are dominated by  a few 
observations corresponding to the I980 credit controls. 
16. To give a sense of  magnitudes, in December 1988, total commercial paper outstanding was 
approximately $455 billion and dealer-placed finance company paper and nonfinancial company 
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There have also been some changes in the type of  firms which issue com- 
mercial paper. In the nineteenth century, it was  often the less established or 
less well regarded firms that issued commercial paper; firms with stronger rep- 
utations borrowed from banks.”  This pattern changed gradually, and by  the 
end of  World War I it was typically large firms with solid credit ratings that 
issued commercial paper. This is still the case today. This change in the quality 
of borrowers in the commercial paper market is the obvious explanation for 
the change from negative to positive values of the spread over the last century, 
shown in figure 8.8. 
It is hard to see how either of these changes (the growth of the commercial 
paper market or the switch to higher quality borrowers) could have caused the 
spread to fall after some monetary contractions in the early period if the lend- 
ing channel were important. The market for commercial paper was certainly 
large enough and established enough by  1890 that it could absorb a significant 
increase in  the supply of  commercial paper without extreme movements in 
interest rates. Similarly, even if less high quality firms typically issued com- 
mercial paper in the earlier years than in  the interwar or post-World  War  I1 
periods, a decline in bank lending which made it harder for all firms to get 
loans would be expected to raise the loan rate relative to the commercial paper 
rate. Thus, neither of  the major changes in the commercial paper market is 
likely to have made the spread fall after monetary contractions if the lending 
channel was important. 
One institutional factor that could account for the peculiar behavior of the 
spread after financial panics is the fact that banks held a substantial fraction of 
the stock of  commercial paper in the pre-1929 era. Greef (1938, 62) argues 
that a banking panic which strapped banks for reserves caused their demand 
for commercial paper to decline. If this effect were large enough, it could cause 
the commercial paper rate to rise and thus could cause the spread between the 
loan rate and the commercial paper rate to rise less than it otherwise might, or 
conceivably, even to fall. However, it is important to note that this explanation 
does not account for the very large fall in the spread following the monetary 
contraction of 1920 because in this episode there was little or no distress in the 
financial system. 
There are alternative hypotheses that could also explain the fall in the spread 
after early monetary contractions. Most obviously, if the spread merely indi- 
cates default risk, then one might expect the spread to fall in the late 1800s 
and early 1900s because commercial paper was the more risky asset. This same 
reasoning could explain why the spread rises after monetary contractions in 
the postwar era, since today commercial paper is the less risky asset. This alter- 
native, while consistent with the data, is not consistent with the view that the 
spread provides an  indication of  the strength of  the lending channel in any 
period since it implies that movements in the spread are driven significantly  by 
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movements in default risk rather than by  movements in the supply of  loans 
relative to bonds. 
8.3.2  TheMix 
One factor that potentially complicates the interpretation of  our results on 
the behavior of the spread is the fact that since there are other dimensions to a 
loan besides the interest rate-collateral,  for example-the  observed interest 
rate may  not be an accurate measure of  its price. Or course, as long as the 
reported interest rate is one component of the price of a loan, the spread should 
still vary in the direction implied by the lending channel if this component of 
the transmission mechanism is empirically important. Nevertheless, this con- 
sideration implies the presence of  possibly substantial noise in the relation 
between monetary contractions and the behavior of the spread. 
In response to this problem of using observed spreads, Kashyap, Stein, and 
Wilcox  (1993)  suggest examining quantity  variables  as  indicators of  the 
strength of  the lending channel. In particular, they note that if both banks and 
firms regard loans and securities as imperfect substitutes, a monetary contrac- 
tion should lower the quantity of bank loans relative to total credit extended. 
This implication is immune to the criticism that a decline in output for any 
reason will endogenously tend to induce a decline in bank loans, since even 
in the face of declining output the lending hypothesis implies that monetary 
contractions induce a substitution by firms away from bank borrowing toward 
commercial paper issuance.'* Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox test this implication 
by  examining the ratio of bank loans to bank loans plus commercial paper 
outstanding immediately following four of the Romer and Romer (1989) epi- 
sodes. They show that this variable, referred to as the mix, tends to fall after 
Romer dates, consistent with the implications of the lending hypothesis. We 
extend this approach to early post-World  War I1 and interwar data. 
Data and Spec8cation 
The mix variable is calculated by taking the ratio of bank loans outstanding 
to the sum of commercial paper and bank loans outstanding. In calculating the 
mix we examine quarterly averages of monthly data. Monthly data on the nom- 
inal value of  commercial paper outstanding are available from the Federal 
Reserve starting in 1919.19  Over time, however, there have been changes in the 
definition and breakdown of the commercial paper data. To the extent possible, 
we  use  only  data  on  dealer-placed,  non-bank-related commercial  paper. 
Dealer-placed financial company commercial paper is included in the total, 
18. Gertler and Gilchrist (1991) discuss possible problems of interpretation  with the Kashyap- 
Stein-Wilcox approach. 
19. The data for 1919-40  are from US.  Board of Governors (1976a. 465-67,  tables 126-27). 
The data for 1941-69  are from U.S.  Board of  Governors (1976b. 714-18,  tables  12.10-12.11). 
The data for 1970-78  are from the Federal Reserve's Annual Statisrical Digest (1980, 73-74,  table 
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but most financial company paper is directly placed and therefore excluded. 
Whenever there are changes in definition or data collection procedures and a 
period of  overlap is given, we  use ratio splices to prevent discrete jumps in 
the series.2o 
For the period 1919 to 1991 we use loans data from the asset statement of 
Weekly Reporting Member Banks in Leading Cities collected by  the Federal 
Reserve.2' This series reports total loans of reporting banks every Wednesday 
of the year. We  use the data for the last Wednesday of the quarter as the quar- 
terly observation.22  Because there are some changes in definition and sample 
over time, we again use ratio splices when there is an obvious break in the 
series and an observation of overlap is available.23 
Results 
Figure 8.10 displays the mix for the period since 1919. Although we use 
slightly different data series in order to enhance comparability over time, our 
results for the second half of the postwar period are quite similar to those pre- 
sented by  Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox. After the monetary shocks in  1968, 
1974, 1978, 1979, and  1988 the mix declines consistently. One should note 
that during the period from about 1965 on the mix displays a general down- 
ward trend, but the declines following the five most recent Romer and Romer 
dates appear somewhat faster than implied by the negative trend. 
In the early postwar and interwar periods, however, the mix does not gener- 
ally behave as predicted by the lending hypothesis. During the 1947 and 1955 
contractions the mix remains approximately constant, and subsequent to the 
1931 and 1920 contractions the mix rises. It does fall slightly although briefly 
in 1937 and declines more consistently after the bank holiday in 1933. 
In light of the information presented in section 8.2, the behavior of the mix 
is most anomalous in the 1920 episode. According to all the measures consid- 
ered there, the lending channel should have been stronger in the 1920s than 
during any later period. Yet, during the one monetary contraction in the 1920s 
the mix behaves exactly contrary to the implications of the lending hypothesis. 
The behavior of the mix in 193  1 is also difficult to reconcile with the lending 
view. Although bank loans had declined as a fraction of bank assets by  1931, 
most of this decline presumably reflected an endogenous response of lending 
20. Splices are done in January 1970, August 1959, and December 1952. 
21. The data for 1919-41  are  from U.S. Board of Governors (1976a, 132-62,  table 48). The 
data for  1942-70  are from U.S.  Board of Governors (1976b, 256-82,  table 4.1).  The data after 
1970 are from various issues of the Annual Sraristical Digest of  the Federal Reserve. 
22. We have examined both seasonally adjusted and unadjusted data. Since the differences be- 
tween the results were extremely small, we present only the unadjusted results for comparability 
with Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox. 
23. The two cases where we are able to do splices are in June  1969, when there was a change 
in the  reporting form, and in January  1972, when all of the  data back to  1972 were revised to 
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Fig. 8.10  The mix and monetary contractions, 1919-91 
Note: The mix is calculated as the ratio of  bank loans outstanding to the sum of bank loans and 
commercial paper outstanding. Vertical lines denote the dates of  negative monetary shocks. 293  Historical Perspectives on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
to the fall in output, rather than a structural change in the importance of  the 
lending channel. Therefore, the mix should have fallen rather than risen in 
this episode. 
Changes in the Commercial Paper Market 
As with the spread, it is important to consider whether there is anything 
peculiar about the commercial paper market that could explain the dramatic 
rise of the mix in 1920. First, at a general level, the argument that the expansion 
and improvement in the quality of commercial paper should not have affected 
the behavior of the spread also applies to the mix. The commercial paper mar- 
ket was large enough and comprised of high enough quality borrowers by the 
end of World War I that a monetary contraction which reduced the ability of 
firms to borrow from banks should have  led to a rise in commercial paper 
issued relative to bank loans. 
The effect on the commercial paper market of the establishment of the Fed- 
eral Reserve is a complicated topic that may be related to the behavior of the 
mix in 1920. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 made commercial paper eligible 
for  rediscount  by  the  Federal  Reserve  banks  for  their  member  banks. 
According to Greef, this “created a broader and more continuous market for 
notes handled by dealers and thus gave them a greater degree of liquidity than 
they had possessed at any previous time” (1938, 143). This presumably encour- 
aged the growth of the commercial paper market. At the same time, however, 
the Federal Reserve sought to encourage the development of the bankers’ ac- 
ceptances market by  also allowing member banks to accept bills of exchange 
for  Both Greef and Macaulay (1938) argue that this development 
may have had little effect on the commercial paper market because acceptances 
were typically used for financing transactions very different from those for 
which commercial paper was used. Greef thinks that changes in firm operating 
practices, the boom in the stock market, and the generally unsettled condition 
of business in the 1920s were the more important sources of a decline in the 
volume of commercial paper issued in the 1920s. 
Even if the policies of the Federal Reserve were a factor in the long-term 
rise in the mix in the interwar era, it is hard to see how this could explain the 
dramatic rise in the mix in 1920. As can be seen in figure 8.9, the rise in the 
mix in 1920 and 1921 exceeds any reasonable estimate of the usual trend be- 
havior of this series. 
8.3.3  The Correlation between Output and Lending 
A final test of the strength of the lending channel in different eras involves 
examining the correlation between output and lending both  after monetary 
contractions and in other periods. In any time period there is likely to be a 
positive correlation between lending and output because lending has a substan- 
tial endogenous component: investment and loans tend to go up when the econ- 
24. Bankers’ acceptances are two-name paper; they are a direct liability of the firm issuing them 
and a contingent liability of the bank guaranteeing funds at maturity. 294  Jeffrey A. Miron, Christina D. Romer, and David N. Weil 
omy is doing well and fall when the economy is declining. However, if lending 
also has an independent component which declines in monetary contractions 
and actually causes a fall in output, the correlation between lending and output 
should be even higher than usual soon after monetary contractions, because 
both the usual endogenous response and the independent lending channel will 
be operating. This reasoning suggests that the differential in the correlation 
between output and lending after monetary contractions and in other times 
provides information about the importance of the lending channel. If there is a 
large difference between the two correlations, this is evidence that there is 
a lending channel to the monetary transmission mechanism. Comparing this 
differential across eras can indicate whether the lending channel used to be 
stronger in the past than it is today. 
Data and Specijkation 
For these calculations we use quarterly data on lending and industrial pro- 
duction. The lending data that  we  use for this calculation come from two 
sources. For the period 1884 to 1929 we use data collected by  the Comptroller 
of the Currency. These data show the quantity of loans held by national banks 
on particular call dates during the year.25  While this series does not show data 
for the same dates each year or for every month, there is almost always one 
call date in each quarter of  the year. When there is more than one call date 
in  a quarter, we  use the later of  the two as the observation for the quarter.26 
Furthermore, as discussed above, since national banks account for nearly half 
of  all bank assets in the pre-1929 era, this loan series has reasonably broad 
coverage. For the period  1919 to  1991 we  use the loans data from Weekly 
Reporting Member Banks discussed in section 8.3.2. 
The industrial production series for 1919-91  is from the Federal Reserve 
Board. Before 1919 we use a smoothed version of the index of industrial pro- 
duction compiled by Miron and Romer (1990). This series is smoothed based 
on a regression of the Federal Reserve Board index for 1920-29 on the Miron- 
Romer series.27 
Since the relationship between lending and output is presumably more com- 
plicated than a simple contemporaneous correlation we use the following re- 
gression to estimate the correlation. We first detrend and seasonally adjust both 
lending and industrial production by  regressing the percentage changes on 
quarterly dummy variables and a linear trend and then taking the residuals. We 
then regress the residuals for industrial production on the contemporaneous 
25. The data for 1884-1918 are given in U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, 1919,Annual  Report 
(pp. 276-303).  The data for 1919 are from the  1924 Annual Report. The data for 1920-24  are 
from the  1927 Annual Report. The data for 1925-32  are from the  1932 Annual Report. Since 
the early data lump total loans and discounts together with overdrafts, we include overdrafts in the 
total when they begin to be reported separately in 1898. 
26. After 1924 it is often the case that there is no call date in the third quarter of the year but 
instead two observations for the fourth quarter. For these cases we take the first call date for the 
fourth quarter (which is typically in early October) as the observation for the third quarter. 
27. See Romer (1994) for a full discussion of this adjustment. 295  Historical Perspectives on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
Table 8.1  R”s  from Regressions of Industrial Production on Lending 
0-1  2 Quarters after a 
Sample Period  Monetary Contraction  All Other Times 
Comptroller of the Currency Lending Data 
1885:  1-1929~4  0.32  0.08 
1885:  1-1  9 14:4  0.35  0.13 
1920: 1-1929:4  0.56  0.10 
Weekly Reporting Banks Lending Data 
1920:1-1929:4 
1920: 1-19404 
1948:  1-1  99 1  :2 
1948:1-1970:4 











value and three lags of the residuals for lending. The Rz’s of the regressions are 
a measure of the explanatory power of lagged and contemporaneous lending 
for movements in real output. We run this regression both for the sample period 
that includes only the twelve quarters after monetary contractions and for the 
sample period that consists of all other times. We  estimate this pair of regres- 
sions for different eras, including our main periods of comparison, 1885-1929 
and 1948-9 1. 
Results 
The R2’s of these regressions for different eras are given in table 8.1. First, 
because the lending data change between the pre-1914 and post- 1948 period, 
it is important to compare the results for the period 1919 to 1929, when both 
lending series exist. As can be seen from the table, the two lending series give 
very similar results for the 1920s;  the R2’s for both regressions are nearly iden- 
tical using the two different lending series. 
Because data differences do not seem to matter, it is reasonable to compare 
the data before  1929 with those after 1948. For the period  1885-1929,  the 
spread between the R2 for the regression for the period twelve quarters after 
monetary contractions  and that for all other times is 0.24. For the period 1948- 
91, the spread in R2’s is 0.17. These results suggest that there has been little 
change in the spread in R2’s over time. To the degree that there is any differ- 
ence, the spread in the R2’s is slightly larger before 1929 than after 1948. The 
results also show that the absolute spread is fairly small in both eras, on the 
order of 0.2. To put this spread in perspective, the same type of regression for 
money (using data on M1) yields spreads of between 0.3 and 0.4 for various 
sample periods in the postwar era.28 
28. The data on M 1 for I91 9-58  are from Friedrnan and Schwartz (  1963,709-2 1, table A- 1, 
col. 7). The data for 1959-91  are from the Citibase data bank, July 1992 update. A ratio splice is 296  Jeffrey A. Miron, Christina D. Romer, and David N. Weil 
There is some variation in the relationship between the R2’s when one looks 
at certain shorter sample periods. First, the spread between the RZ  for the re- 
gression estimated for the sample period after monetary contractions and that 
for all other times is substantially bigger for the  1920s than for the period 
before 1914: the spread is roughly 0.5 for the 1920s and 0.2 for the three de- 
cades before  1914. This finding should be interpreted with caution, however, 
because  there is only one monetary contraction during the  1920s (1920:l). 
Second, within the postwar era, the results are somewhat different for the two 
decades before  1970 than for the two decades after. The spread between the 
R2’s for the two regressions before 1970 is 0.23, almost identical to that in the 
pre-1929 era. For the period  1971-91, however, the spread is only 0.08. This 
suggests that, if anything, the lending channel has gotten weaker over the post- 
war era. 
8.4  Conclusions 
Our goal in this paper has been to use historical data to shed light on the 
importance of the lending channel of monetary  transmission. We began by 
laying out a model in which shocks to the money supply affect aggregate de- 
mand through both the money and lending channels. We used this model to 
analyze the effect of structural changes on the importance of the lending chan- 
nel. We showed that increasing the fraction of bank assets made up of loans 
and raising the reserve requirement on bank issue of liabilities, such as time 
loans or CDs, increases the importance of the lending channel. Similarly, rai- 
sing the fraction of firm finance made up of bank loans or the fraction of invest- 
ment done by bank-dependent small firms makes the lending channel more im- 
portant. 
Armed with the results of this modeling exercise, we then analyzed the his- 
torical changes in the structure of finance. We found that several changes in 
financial structure over the past one hundred years should have had major ef- 
fects on the importance of the lending channel. The fraction of bank portfolios 
held in the form of  loans declined dramatically  during the Depression  and 
World War I1 eras and rose during the latter half of the post-World  War I1 era 
to nearly its pre-Depression level. Both absolute and relative reserve require- 
ments on time deposits and CDs fell dramatically  with the founding of the 
Federal Reserve and fell further in the post-World  War  I1 period. Similarly, 
the ratio of bank loans to the capital stock fell dramatically with the onset of 
used to connect the two series in January 1959. The usual money-output relationship breaks down 
after the 1988 monetary contraction: the movements in money are much larger and further behind 
the movements in output than after other monetary contractions. For this reason, the spread in 
the R2’s for money is small for sample periods that include the post- 1987 period, but large for the 
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the Great Depression and did not return to its pre-1929 level until the second 
half of the post-World  War I1 era. The relative importance of  unincorporated 
firms, which are presumably more dependent on banks than are corporations, 
fell over the first seventy years of the twentieth century, although it rose in the 
1970s and 1980s to levels higher than those experienced before the Depres- 
sion. The overall effect of these changes should have been to weaken the lend- 
ing  channel in  the  early  post-World  War  I1 period  compared to the  pre- 
Depression era. The lending channel may have been stronger in the second half 
of the post-World  War I1 era than in the first half, but whether it should have 
been as strong as the pre-Depression era is not clear. 
We  then turned to the data to see whether we could find evidence of  the 
changes in the importance of the lending channel predicted by our model given 
the observed changes in financial structure. The results of  this exercise were 
striking. The systematic increase in the interest-rate spread between loans and 
bonds that the lending channel predicts should follow a monetary contraction 
does not appear in the data. The mix, which declined following monetary con- 
tractions in the later post-World  War I1 period, fails to do so in the one pre- 
Depression contraction for which we  have  evidence. Finally, the difference 
between the R2’s of regressions of output on lending inside and outside of con- 
tractionary episodes is no larger in the pre-Depression period than in the post- 
World War I1 period. 
Our failure to find evidence of  the systematic changes in the response of 
these indicators to monetary contractions predicted by  our model of the lend- 
ing channel is subject to two interpretations. First, the indicators we examine 
may simply be poor measures of the importance of the lending channel. In this 
case, much of the evidence in favor of the existence of a strong postwar lending 
channel would have to be questioned. Alternatively, it may be that changes in 
the importance of the lending channel have not been reflected in these meas- 
ures because the lending channel itself is very weak. As a result, most of the 
movement in these indicators would be due to noise or random events, not to 
changes in the specialness of bank loans over time. Our analysis does not rule 
decisively on which of  these two explanations is correct. However, both of 
these interpretations suggest that the empirical relevance of the lending chan- 
nel has yet to be demonstrated. 
Appendix 
Balance Sheet Data for Firms and Households 
The data come from three basic sources: Goldsmith, Lipsey, and Mendelson 
(1963), the U.S. Board of  Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1973), 
and the U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1990). These 298  Jeffrey A. Miron, Christina D. Romer, and David N. Weil 
sources are referred to as GLM, FRB  1973, and FRB  1990, respectively, in 
the following descriptions. We  line up the data from GLM on nonfinancial 
corporations with the FRB series on corporate, nonfinancial business, and the 
data from GLM on nonfarm unincorporated businesses with the FRB series on 
nonfarm, noncorporate business. 
The general strategy is to line up particular components of the balance sheet 
that are of interest, such as total liabilities, bank loans not elsewhere classified, 
and bonds and notes, from the different sources and then ratio splice them 
together. The ratio splices are necessary because the series do not line up ex- 
actly due to slight changes in concepts and measurement techniques over time. 
The data for 1966-89  are from FRB 1990 and are taken as they are. The data 
for 1946-66  are from FRB 1973 and are ratio spliced to the modern data in 
1966. The data for 1900-45 are from GLM and are spliced on in 1945. 
Nonfinancial Corporations 
The balance sheet data for 1900-45 are given in GLM (1963, 146, table III- 
4b). The data for 1945-66 are from FRB (1973,85-87).  The data for 1966-89 
are from FRB (1990, 9-10).  The GLM data include commercial paper liabili- 
ties in the bonds and notes category, while the FRB reports bonds and open- 
market  paper  separately  (GLM,  p.  10).  We  combine  the  two  to 
be the extension of the GLM series. Trade debt is gross for both sources. The 
data for corporate equities for  1900-45  is from GLM (1963, 318-19,  table 
IV-b- 17b). The equities data for 1945-66  are from FRB  (1  973, 11  7-1  9) and 
for 1966-89  are from FRB (1990,9-10). 
Nonfarm, Unincorporated Businesses 
We  had hoped to form a continuous balance sheet for nonfarm, unincorpo- 
rated businesses as well as for corporations. However, in 1945, the one year of 
overlap between the two series, bank loans n.e.c. are roughly nine times larger 
in the GLM data than in the FRB data. Much of this difference appears to be 
due to how total liabilities are allocated among categories. For this reason, we 
do not examine the individual elements of the unincorporated business sector. 
We do, however, use the data on total liabilities. The data for 1900-45 are from 
GLM (1963, 128, table 111-2a). Data for 1945-66 are from FRB (1973, 85-87) 
and for  1966-89  from FRB (1990, 7-8).  Adjustment of  the FRB series is 
needed because for 1945-66 the total liabilities series includes net trade debt, 
while GLM and the later FRB series includes gross trade debt (GLM, p. 9). 
For these years we subtract net trade debt from total liabilities, and add in gross 
trade debt. 299  Historical Perspectives on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
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COmment  Ben S.  Bernanke 
It will probably not come as a surprise that I find the evidence found by these 
authors against the “lending” view of monetary policy transmission to be less 
compelling than they do, and I will devote most of this Comment to explaining 
why. But Miron, Romer, and Weil (MRW) are nevertheless to be commended 
for bringing the historical approach to bear on the question of how monetary 
policy changes are transmitted to the economy. Given the inherent difficulties 
of  discriminating among hypothesized channels of monetary transmission, it 
is certainly worthwhile to see whether the important changes that have oc- 
curred in financial institutions, markets, and regulations over the last century 
can provide any identifying power. In a similar spirit, international differences 
Ben S. Bemanke is professor of  economics and public affairs at Princeton University and a 
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in financial markets and institutions existing at a given time might also prove 
useful for identifying the channels of monetary transmission. 
The meat of this article is to be found in sections 8.2  and 8.3, in which MRW 
attempt to build an empirical case against the existence of a lending channel. 
In brief, the logic of their case is as follows: First, in section 8.2, MRW use 
historical information about changes in financial institutions, financial regula- 
tion, and portfolio behavior to argue that the lending channel, if it ever existed, 
is likely to have become weaker over time. Second, in section 8.3, they exam- 
ine some empirical indicators of the lending channel, looking for changes in 
the behavior of these indicators across different subperiods. Since they do not 
find that these indicators differ across subperiods in the way suggested by their 
analysis of  section 8.2, they conclude that the lending channel was probably 
not important in any period. 
I think both steps of this argument are subject to question. Let me take them 
in order, beginning with the proposition that the lending channel has become 
less important. 
Most of section 8.2’s conclusion that the lending channel has weakened over 
time depends on treating endogenous variables (such as the ratios of loans to 
securities in the banking sector, or the share of capital financed by bank loans) 
as if  they  were exogenous. For the type of argument MRW want to make, 
however, it is not enough to know that the values taken on by certain endoge- 
nous variables have changed over time; it is crucial also to know why the en- 
dogenous variable changed, and what else was changing in the system at the 
same time. 
For example, the finding that over some period loans fell relative to the capi- 
tal stock-the  result, MRW argue, of the increased development of the equity 
market-does  not necessarily imply that the lending channel became less im- 
portant, as the authors conclude.’ It could just as well be argued, for example, 
that the withdrawal of large firms from the use of bank credit resulted in the 
typical bank borrower having fewer alternative credit sources and less internal 
finance available than before. This change would imply a sharper effect of  a 
given contraction of bank lending on spending, since borrowers denied bank 
credit would have nowhere else to go. 
Similarly, the increased share of loans in banks’ portfolios in the latter post- 
war period does not necessarily imply that the lending channel was strengthen- 
ing after 1970, as the MRW methodology would suggest: rather, it is likely that 
this increase in loan share was driven by developments such as securitization 
that increased the liquidity of bank loans, as well as improvements in money 
markets  that  reduced  banks’  precautionary  demand  for  securities.  These 
changes might well have weakened the lending channel on net by increasing 
1. Inventory stocks would be a more reasonable denominator than the capital stock in this appli- 
cation, since bank loans are typically used to finance working capital rather than long-term fixed 
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banks’ willingness to reduce securities holdings to low levels in times of tight 
money. 
The bottom line is that, to make the case for regime changes, it is important 
to focus on fundamental institutional or regulatory changes rather than on en- 
dogenous choice variables of banks or firms, as MRW have done in a number 
of cases. 
A second general objection to the analysis of section 8.2 is its asymmetry: 
it looks at only the institutional changes affecting the potency of the lending 
view but not those affecting the potency of the money view. In fact, a number 
of changes-most  notably, the development of a variety of close money substi- 
tutes-would  lead one to guess that the “money channel” has weakened over 
this period as well. Thus it is possible that the relative contribution of the lend- 
ing channel to the overall impact effect of monetary policy changes has risen 
or stayed the same instead of falling. It seems to me that the failure to control 
for changes in the money channel vitiates the tests of section 8.3, which implic- 
itly assume that the potency of the money channel has not changed. 
A final comment to be made about the historical analysis has to do with 
truth in advertising: although there are qualifications in the paper, when inter- 
preting or summarizing their results MRW  tend to overstate the degree to 
which the weakening of  the lending channel can be found in the data. For 
example, in their introduction they write, “Our analysis shows that the lending 
channel should have played a much greater role in the pre- 1929 era than during 
the post-World  War I1 period, especidy  the early part of this period” (italics 
mine). I think any reasonable parsing of that sentence gives the meaning that 
the strength of the lending channel was definitely lower after 1970 than before 
1929, even though the difference might have  been  less than the difference 
between the early postwar period and the pre-1929 period. Yet,  even if  we 
accept MRW’s  methodology (which I have  suggested we  should not), this 
claim is not well supported by  what they find. For example, figures 8.4, 8.5, 
and 8.7 of their paper suggest that the lending channel was approximately as 
strong after 1970 as it was pre-1929. The implication is that MRW’s tests of 
section 8.3 must rely heavily, not on obvious differences between the pre-1929 
and post-1945 eras, but rather on the outlying observations generated by  the 
experience of the 1950s and early 1960s. 
In section 8.3, as I have noted, MRW examine the behavior of some indica- 
tors of the lending channel across the “regimes” identified in section 8.2. Not 
finding the differences in behavior across regimes that they expect, they con- 
clude that the lending view must have  never been relevant. I find this logic 
strange. As an analogy, consider a scientist with two beakers (metaphors for 
the prewar and postwar periods). Suppose that the scientist has pretty good a 
priori reasons (based on historical analysis) to believe that a certain compound 
(the lending view) is in beaker A (the prewar period), but is unsure about 
whether the compound is in beaker B (the postwar period) as well. Using in- 
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beaker B for the compound. Not receiving a definitive answer, she then uses 
the same instruments to test beaker A, again not finding anything definitive. 
What should the scientist conclude? MRW seem to think that the right conclu- 
sion is that the compound is in neither beaker, despite the a priori reasons to 
believe that the compound was in beaker A. It seems to me that the right con- 
clusion is instead that the instruments aren’t any good. 
In  fact, the “instruments” used by  MRW  to detect a lending channel are 
quite tenuous. I discuss each of MRW’s three indicator variables briefly: 
The Loan Rate-Commercial  Paper Rate Spread 
The authors use this interest-rate spread to proxy for the loan-bond spread 
in the theoretical model, a spread which the model predicts should rise when 
monetary tightening reduces the relative supply of bank loans. Unfortunately, 
this proxy is a poor one: First, the empirical bank-loan rate does not measure 
the marginal cost of bank funds to a constant-quality borrower, as it would 
have to do to match the theoretical construct. Rather, factors such as changing 
borrower mix, changes in collateral and other nonprice terms, and possibly 
rationing may make the empirical loan rate behave very differently from its 
theoretical counterpart. In particular, counter to a claim of the paper, it is plau- 
sible that the theoretical and empirical spreads do not even have to move in the 
same direction. For example, there is good evidence that banks drop smaller 
and riskier borrowers in favor of larger, safer ones during a recession. This 
“flight to quality” effect alone could explain the sometimes perverse move- 
ments of the empirical loan rate. 
As the empirical loan rate is a poor proxy for the loan rate in the theory, so 
is the commercial paper rate a poor proxy for the safe rate in the model. Com- 
mercial paper (CP) is not a safe (or even completely liquid) asset; early in the 
MRW sample there were periods in which the CP rate actually exceeded the 
loan rate. In the postwar period, the commercial paper rate (and the CP rate- 
Treasury-bill rate) has been a sensitive indicator of monetary contractions and 
credit crunches, probably because of imperfect liquidity of  the CP market. 
Thus using the CP rate as a proxy for the safe rate is likely to be highly mis- 
leading. 
The reader of this comment may suspect that my criticism of the loan rate- 
CP rate spread as an indicator arises in part because I don’t like the results of 
the test. On the contrary, the empirical problems with using this spread as an 
indicator have been understood in the literature for a long time. In my  1983 
paper, for example, I wrote 
It would be useful to have a direct measure of the CCI [the bank’s loan rate 
less the cost of funds]; unfortunately, no really satisfactory representation of 
this concept is available. Reported commercial loan rates reflect loans that 
are actually made, not the shadow cost of bank funds to the representative 
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safest and highest-quality  loans, measured loan rates may  well move in- 
versely to the CCI. (Bemanke 1983, 264) 
I have made similar observations in a number of subsequent papers, as have 
other people working on this topic. 
The Correlation between Output and Lending 
As the basis for another test of the lending view, MRW argue that, if the 
lending view is true, loans and output should be more strongly correlated dur- 
ing periods of monetary restriction than otherwise. However, they do not pre- 
sent any formal explanation of why we should take the simple correlation of 
two endogenous variables as evidence for a structural hypothesis. Indeed, there 
are forces working in the opposite direction of their claim: for example, most 
studies of the response of loans to a monetary contraction find that loans actu- 
ally rise in the short run, a pattern that appears to be the result of larger firms 
taking down their lines of bank credit in order to finance unintended inventory 
accumulations. This pattern is not inconsistent with a role for the lending chan- 
nel in the medium run (indeed, small firms without lines of credit feel the brunt 
in the short run); yet the “perverse” movement of loans immediately following 
a monetary contraction could rationalize even a decline in the correlation of 
loans and output during periods of  monetary stringency. More broadly, as I 
have argued in much greater detail in a Comment on Ramey (1993), it is gener- 
ally not the case that reduced-form correlations or timing relationships among 
output, money, and loans can identify the channels of monetary transmission. 
As it happens, however, MRW do find a stronger relationship between in- 
dustrial production and bank lending during the three years following a mone- 
tary contraction than at other times (their table 8.1). Rather than emphasize 
this finding, however, MRW look at the differences of  differences of  R2’s (of 
the regression of output on lending) across the various regimes, arguing that 
the differential link of output and lending (between tight money periods and 
other periods) should be stronger where the lending channel is stronger. At this 
point, noise in the data must be the dominant factor. Incredibly, and swallowing 
all the logical steps leading up to this test, the MRW results don’t look that bad 
for the lending view: the differential R2’s  do seem to fall over time, as predicted 
by the premise that the lending channel has weakened over time. Nevertheless, 
without statistical or other rationales,  MRW conclude that these results are 
somehow not favorable to the lending view. I don’t understand why not, given 
the logic of the test. 
The Mix between Bank Loans and Commercial Paper 
In an innovative paper, Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) showed that the 
ratio of loans to commercial paper fell sharply in periods of monetary strin- 
gency, a result they interpreted as confirming the lending view’s implication 
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sources. MRW reproduce these results for the postwar period but find them to 
be less evident in other periods.  In  particular, during the  1920 tight money 
episode loans actually rose relative to commercial paper. 
Of the three indicators that MRW use, I think the “mix” variable is the most 
legitimate, and the only one of the three that can be called (in MRW’s phrase) 
a “traditional” indicator of  the lending view.  Thus I find MRW’s evidence, 
particularly the anomalous 1920 episode, to be intriguing and worth exploring 
further. My guess is, though, that the explanation for 1920 will turn out to 
lie in differences in institutions between then and now. In particular, in 1920 
commercial paper was not backed by bank lines of credit (as it almost always 
is today), and commercial paper borrowers often posed as much credit risk as 
bank borrowers. Thus it is possible that the “flight to quality” phenomenon 
worked in the opposite direction in 1920 than it does today. 
In challenging MRW’s specific tests, I do not mean to imply by any means 
that the existence of the lending channel is not a testable proposition. On the 
contrary, there is now quite a large body of evidence-including  observations 
on the nature of institutional arrangements, historical experiences, and more 
formal econometric studies-that  confirms various aspects of the lending view 
hypothesis. This evidence is discussed very completely by Kashyap and Stein 
in chapter 7 of this volume, so I will not restate those points here. But MRW’s 
implication that there exists no positive evidence for a lending channel-even 
a lending channel that plays a relatively small role in  the overall monetary 
policy transmission process-is  clearly not correct. 
This brings me to a final general point, which again concerns the asymmetry 
of the testing procedure followed by MRW. MRW implicitly treat the conven- 
tional money view as the null hypothesis; when their tests do not turn up con- 
vincing evidence for the lending view, they seem happy to ascribe all of  the 
(unexplained) impact of monetary policy  to the money channel. But MRW 
never offer any positive evidence for the money view! 
What if we were to turn the exercise around and make the lending view the 
null hypothesis,  thereby putting the burden  of  proof on the money view? I 
think the money view would do badly. First of all, as I discussed in the previous 
paragraph, there is a respectable set of arguments and evidence making the 
positive case for the existence of the lending view. (The case for the lending 
view becomes even stronger when its definition is broadened to include other 
imperfect capital markets phenomena,  such as balance sheet and cash flow 
effects.) In contrast, the proposition that the money channel is powerful runs 
into some challenging empirical problems. These difficulties include (a)  the 
increasing  prevalence  of  money  substitutes,  which reduces the leverage of 
the money channel on interest rates; (b)  the “term structure problem,” that is, 
the relative inability of the Fed to control long-term as opposed to short-term 
interest rates (presumably, long-term rates are the ones relevant to most firm 
investment decisions); and (c) the “cost of capital problem,” that is, the consis- 
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investment decisions very much. A serious defense of the conventional money 
view should address these issues as well as attack the lending view. 
I have tried to refute what I believe to be invalid or fragile conclusions drawn 
by this paper, particularly the rather implausible claim that the lending channel 
should be given literally no weight at all in the monetary transmission process. 
Evidence and common sense tell us that both the money and lending channels 
must be operative to some degree. The real question (both for economists and 
Federal Reserve policymakers) is quantitative: how big are the two channels 
and by how much has their relative importance changed over time? We  should 
try to develop and estimate general models of bank, depositor, and borrower 
behavior that will allow us to get at these questions. 
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